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Abstract. Even when confronted with the same data, agents often disagree on a model of the real-world. Here,
we address the question of how interacting heterogenous agents, who disagree on what model the
real-world follows, optimize their trading actions. The market has latent factors that drive prices,
and agents account for the permanent impact they have on prices. This leads to a large stochastic
game, where each agents’ performance criteria is computed under a different probability measure. We
analyse the mean-field game (MFG) limit of the stochastic game and show that the Nash equilibria
is given by the solution to a non-standard vector-valued forward-backward stochastic differential
equation. Under some mild assumptions, we construct the solution in terms of expectations of the
filtered states. We prove the MFG strategy forms an -Nash equilibrium for the finite player game.
Lastly, we present a least-squares Monte Carlo based algorithm for computing the optimal control
and illustrate the results through simulation in market where agents disagree on the model.
1. Introduction. Financial markets are immensely complicated dynamic systems which
incorporate the interactions of millions of individuals on a daily basis. Market participants
vary immensely, both in terms of their trading objectives and in their beliefs on the assets they
are trading. All of these participants compete with one another in an attempt to achieve their
own personal objectives in the most efficient way possible. Traded assets may also be driven
by latent factors, and agents must dynamically incorporate data into their trading decisions.
In this paper, we propose a game theoretic model in which a large population of heteroge-
neous agents all trade the same asset. This model considers heterogeneity not only from the
point of view of an individual’s trading objectives and risk appetite, but also from the point
of view of each agent’s beliefs regarding the performance of the asset they are trading. We
pay particular attention to the information each agent is privy to, in an attempt to render
the framework as realistic as possible, while maintaining some semblance of tractability.
We study the equilibrium of these markets by using the theory of mean-field games
(MFGs), which serves to describe Game-Theoretic models as the number of participating
agents becomes extremely large. The general theory of mean-field games already has a large
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2 CASGRAIN, P. AND JAIMUNGAL, S.
body of research associated with it. The original works stem from [16], [15], and [19]. Among
the many extensions and generalizations which explore the broad theory of MFGs as well
as their applications, we highlight the following works: [14], [13], [21], and [3]. This theory
has seen applications in various financial contexts, such as [4] and [17] who use it to model
systemic risk, [18] show use it for algorithmic trading in the presence of a major agent and a
population of minor agents, [2] who investigate MFG in the context of optimal execution, and
[9] who look at mean-field games in algorithmic trading with partial information on states.
In contrast to other work on MFGs, as well as its specific application to algorithmic
trading, here, motivated by [6], we include latent states so that agents do not have full
information about the system dynamics. In contrast to [7], who also study a stochastic game
with latent factors, we study how varying beliefs among the agents affect the optimal trading
behaviour. In our model, we express the belief of agents as a probability measure on the
dynamics of the asset price process and of any latent processes that may be driving them. As
far as the authors are aware, this is the first time that MFG with varying beliefs have been
treated in the literature. This generalization is quite non-trivial, nonetheless, we succeed
in characterizing the model equilibrium as the solution to a non-standard forward-backward
stochastic differential equation (FBSDE) defined across the collection of belief measures. We
are able to present a closed form representation for the solution of the MFG and it incorporates
all of the differing market’s beliefs into the decisions of the individual agents.
We structure the remainder of the paper as follows. Section 2 introduces the market model
and the stochastic game that agents participate in. Section 3 begins by introducing the MFG
limit of the stochastic game and then proves that the collection of optimal strategies in the
MFG may be represented as the solution to a system of coupled FBSDEs. Next, the system
of FBSDEs is solved, and the solution to the mean field as well as each individual’s strategy is
provided. Section 4 provides a specific example of a model where the assumptions in the key
results are satisfied. In Section 5 we show that the solution to the MFG satisfies the -Nash
equilibrium property in the finite population game. Lastly, Section 7 provides a least-square
Monte Carlo approach to computing certain expecations, as well as simulated examples of a
market model with agents having differing beliefs.
2. The Model. In this section, we provide the market model and the participating agents
performance criteria. The model presented in the remainder of this section closely resembles
the model for the stochastic game used in [7]. The stochastic game presented here aims to
characterize a population of agents with several sources of heterogeneity. As in [7], here,
agents have varying trading objectives. In addition, however, agents are also characterized
by their beliefs regarding the model driving the asset price process. In the remainder of this
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section, we present the trading mechanics which each of the agents use to interact with the
market, as well as the objectives each of the agents seek to achieve with their actions.
2.1. The Population of Agents. The market consists of a population of N > 0 rational
heterogeneous agents trading a single asset. Agents are indexed with an integer j ∈ N :=
{1, . . . , N}. The total population of agents is divided into K ∈ {1, . . . , N} disjoint sub-
populations, which are indexed by k ∈ K := {1, . . . ,K}. K is assumed to be constant and
independent of N . All agents within a fixed sub-population behave in a homogeneous manner.
The set
(2.1) K(N)k := {j ∈ N : j is in sub-population k}, ∀k ∈ K ,
denotes the set of agents within sub-population k, and the superscript (N) indicates the ex-
plicit dependence on the total number of agents. We also define N
(N)
k := |K(N)k | to be the total
number of agents within sub-population k. We further assume the number of agents contained
in each of the sub-populations remains stable as we take the population limit to infinity. More
specifically, we require that the proportion of agents contained within population k satisfies
(2.2) lim
N→∞
p
(N)
k = pk ∈ (0, 1) where p(N)k =
N
(N)
k
N
.
2.2. The Agent’s State Processes. We work on the filtered probability space (Ω,G =
{Gt}t∈[0,T ],P) completed by the null sets of P and where T ∈ (0,∞) is some fixed time horizon.
All of processes defined in the remainder of this section are G-adapted, unless otherwise
specified, and the notation EP[·] represents expectation with respect to the measure P.
All agents have the ability to buy and sell the asset over the fixed trading period [0, T ],
after which all trading activity comes to a halt. Each agent j ∈ N controls the amount they
wish to purchase or sell at a continuous rate denoted νj = (νjt )t∈[0,T ], where ν
j
t > 0 (ν
j
t < 0)
indicates the rate of buy (sell) orders the agent sends to the market. At the start of the trading
period, each agent is assumed to hold a random amount Qj0 of the asset. Agents keep track
of their holdings in the traded asset with the inventory process qj,ν
j
= (qj,ν
j
t )t∈[0,T ], where
the superscript indicates the explicit dependence on the agent’s controlled rate of trade. The
relationship between agent-j’s trading rate and their inventory process is
(2.3) qj,ν
j
t = Q
j
0 +
∫ t
0
νjt dt .
This can be interpreted as each agent buying or selling an amount  νjt in each small time
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interval [t, t+ ).
Assumption 2.1. We make the technical assumption that the initial inventory holdings of
all agents have a bounded variance, so that ∃ 0 < C < ∞ for which EP(Qj0)2 < C,∀j ∈ N.
Moreover, we assume that the mean of the starting inventory levels are the same within a
given sub-population, so that EP[Qj0] = mk for each j ∈ K(N)k .
Buying and selling actions of agents impact the price of the traded asset in a manner to
be specified below. As well, agents believe the asset midprice follows (potentially) different
models. We incorporate differing beliefs into our model by assigning a probability measure
Pk to each sub-population k ∈ K. The various measures correspond to the model that agents
in a particular sub-population believes to represent the true dynamics of the asset price.
We define the asset price process Sν
(N)
= (Sν
(N)
t )t∈[0,T ], where the superscript ν(N) =
(νj)j∈N indicates the dependence of the price on the actions of all agents in the market. It
is useful to define the average trading rate νk,(N) = (ν
k,(N)
t )t∈[0,T ] of all agents within sub-
population k as
(2.4) ν
k,(N)
t =
1
N
(N)
k
∑
j∈K(N)k
νjt .
Each agent in sub-population k then believes the asset price process follows the dynamics
(2.5) Sν
(N)
t = S0 +
∫ t
0
{
Aku +
∑
k′∈K
λk,k′ p
(N)
k′ ν
k′,(N)
u
}
du+Mkt ,
where for each k ∈ K, Ak = (Akt )t∈[0,T ] is a G-predictable process, Mk = (Mkt )[0,T ] is a G-
adapted Pk-martingale, and λk,k′ > 0 ∀k, k′ ∈ K are constants. We also assume here that
the initial inventory holdings of each agent Qj0j∈(N) are all independent of both {Ak}k∈K and
{Mk}k∈K in each measure Pk.
The measure Pk effectively specifies the sub-population-k’s asset price model through the
processes Ak and Mk, as well as the scale of the market impact of each sub-population,
through set of constants {λk,k′}k′∈K.
Assumption 2.2. Here, we make the technical assumptions that Ak ∈ H2,kT and Mk ∈ L2,kT ,
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where
H2,kT =
{
ft : Ω× [0, T ]→ R : EPk
∫ T
0
‖ft‖2 dt <∞
}
and(2.6)
L2,kT =
{
ft : Ω× [0, T ]→ R : EPk‖ft‖2 <∞ , ∀t ∈ [0, T ]
}
,(2.7)
for each k ∈ K and where ‖·‖ represents the Euclidean norm.
Assumption 2.3. We also make the assumption that Pk ∼ P for all k ∈ K and the law Qj0
under each measure Pk is the same as that under the measure P.
Lastly, we assume that for each k ∈ K, Ak and Mk are uncontrolled – i.e., are unaffected by
the agents’ actions.
Each agent tracks their total accumulated cash process Xj,ν
j
t = (X
j,νj
t )t∈[0,T ] throughout
the trading period. When buying and selling the asset, each agent pays an instantaneous cost
that is linearly proportional to amount of shares transacted. This cost is expressed through
the controlled dynamics of the cash process. For an agent j ∈ K(N)k , their corresponding cash
process is
(2.8) Xj,ν
j
t = X
j
0 −
∫ t
0
(
Sν
(N)
t + ak ν
j
u
)
νju du ,
where ak > 0 is a parameter that is unique to a sub-population k and sets the scale of the
instantaneous cost.
2.3. Information Restriction. In this market model, agents have restricted information
over the course of the trading period. More specifically, agents have access only to the infor-
mation generated by the paths of the asset price process Sν
(N)
, their own inventory process
qj,ν
j
, and the average order flow of each sub-population, νk,(N) =
(
νk,(N)
)
k∈K. We express
this information restriction in our model by restricting the sigma-algebra to which an agent’s
strategy may be adapted. For each j ∈ N, we only allow agent-j to choose strategies contained
within the set of asmissible strategies,
(2.9) Aj := {ω ∈ H2T , ω is F j-predictable} ,
where we define H2T =
⋂
k∈KH
2,k
T , and
(2.10) F jt = σ
(
(Sν
(N)
u ,ν
k,(N)
u )u∈[0,t)
)
∨ σ
(
Qj0
)
,
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which is the sigma-algebra generated by the paths of the asset price process, the total order-
flow proces,, and the starting inventory level for agent j. In definition (2.9), we deliberately
restrict ourselves to processes in H2T , to guarantee that Sν
(N)
t ∈ H2,kT for all k ∈ K.
2.4. The Agent’s Optimization Problem. Each agent chooses their trading strategy to
maximize an objective functional that measures their performance over the course of the
trading period [0, T ]. For each j ∈ N let A−j :=×i∈N,i 6=j Ai. Each agent-j within a sub-
population k ∈ K, chooses a control νj ∈ Aj to maximize a functional Hj : Aj × A−j → R
defined as follows
(2.11) Hj(ν
j , ν−j) = EP
k
[
Xν
j
T + q
j,νj
T
(
Sν
(N)
T −Ψkqj,ν
j
T
)
− φk
∫ T
0
(qj,ν
j
u )
2 du
]
,
where Ψk > 0 and φk ≥ 0 are parameters that vary across, but are constant within, sub-
populations. In definition (2.11), we use the notation ν−j :=
(
ν1, . . . , νj−1, νj+1, . . . , νN
)
to
indicate the dependence of the objective functional on the actions of all other agents in the
population.
The objective functional corresponds to the agent trying to maximize a weighted average
of three separate quantities. The first term Xν
j
T corresponds to the total amount of cash the
agent has accumulated up until time T . The second term, qj,ν
j
T
(
Sν
(N)
T −Ψkqj,ν
j
T
)
corresponds
to the cost of liquidating all of the agent’s leftover inventory at time T , minus a liquidation
penalty controlled by the parameter Ψk. The last term, −φk
∫ T
0 (q
j,νj
u )2 du is a running risk-
aversion penalty that is controlled by the parameter φk, which incentivizes the agent to keep
their market exposure low during the trading period. It may also be interpreted as stemming
from model uncertainty as shown in [5].
Each agent within sub-population k has an objective functional that is computed by
taking expectations under the measure Pk. Hence, agents incorporate their own beliefs on the
asset price dynamics. Furthermore, each functional Hj depends on the actions of all other
players (ν−j) through the dynamics of the asset price Sν(N)t , which implicitly appear in the
definition (2.11).
By expanding the dynamics of each of the state processes present in (2.11), and by using
integration by parts, we may re-write the agent’s objective functional as
(2.12) Hj(ν
j , ν−j) = Cj0 + E
Pk
[∫ T
0
qj,ν
j
t dS
ν(N)
t −
(
νjt
qj,ν
j
t
)ᵀ(
ak Ψk
Ψk φk
)(
νjt
qj,ν
j
t
)
dt
]
,
where Cj0 is a term that is constant with respect to ν
j and ν−j . Each agent’s behaviour is
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characterized entirely by the objective functional they are trying to maximize. From (2.12),
it is clear that the objective functional is parametric so that the agent’s preferences can be
entirely described by the tuple
(
ak, φk,Ψk,Pk
)
and their starting inventory Qj0.
The market model defined above forms a stochastic game in which all participating agents
are competing to maximize each of their own objectives. We wish to find and study this
market at its Nash equilibrium – i.e., where agents are simultaneously at their optimum.
This equilibrium can be described more formally as the collection of admissible strategies
{νj ∈ Aj : j ∈ N} which satisfies the condition
(2.13) νj,∗ = arg max
ω∈Aj
Hj
(
ω, ν−j
)
, ∀j ∈ N .
Obtaining this collection of strategies for the stochastic game with a finite number of players
proves to be a difficult task. One of the main obstacles in finding a solution to this problem
is that each agent’s strategy is adapted to different filtration F j . Furthermore, each of the
objective functionals defined in equation (2.12) are expressed one of K different measures from
the collection of measures {Pk}k∈K, each representing the beliefs of a particular individual.
These two features make the finite-population stochastic game difficult to solve directly. It
is, however, possible to solve the stochastic game in the infinite population limit, and use the
result as an approximation for the finite population game.
3. Solving the Mean-Field Stochastic Game. As the stochastic game presented in Sec-
tion 2.4 presents obstacles when aiming to solve it directly, we now take a different avenue. In
this section, we study the stochastic game as the population limit tends towards infinity. The
resulting limit is that of a stochastic Mean Field Game (MFG) that we can solve. Although
we do not explicitly solve the finite player game presented in Section (2), by establishing an
-Nash equilibrium property in Section 5, we show that the equilibrium solution obtained
for the MFG provides an approximation to the finite population game, provided that the
population size is large enough.
This section begins by taking the population limit as N → ∞, to obtain new objective
functionals for the agents resulting in a stochastic MFG. Next, using convex analysis methods,
we characterize the Nash-equilibrium as the solution to a coupled system of FBSDEs. We then
conclude by presenting a solution to this FBSDE problem, and thus an exact representation
of each agent’s optimal control at the Nash-equilibrium.
3.1. The Limiting Mean-Field Game. Agent-j’s objective functional (2.11) only depends
on the population size N through the dynamics of the mid-price process Sν
(N)
t , which is given
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by the dynamics in equation (2.5).
Assumption 3.1. To proceed, we assume that the limiting trading rate exists, in particular,
there exist processes νk = (νkt )t∈[0,T ] for k ∈ K such that νk ∈ H2T and
(3.1) lim
N→∞
ν
k,(N)
t = ν
k
t , P× µ a.e.,
where µ is the Lebesgue measure on the Borel sigma-algebra B[0,T ], and where P × µ is the
canonical product measure of P and µ.
As each individual νj is F j-predictable, νk must be
(∨
j∈NF j
)
-predictable. Moreover, by our
assumption that Pk ∼ P for each k ∈ K, the limit (3.1) also holds Pk × µ almost everywhere.
From now on, we refer to each of the processes νk,(N) as the mean-field trading rate for
sub-population-k.
Using the assumption that p
(N)
k → pk for all k ∈ K along with (3.1), we find that in the
infinite population limit, from the perspective of agent-j from sub-population k, the dynamics
of the asset price process is
(3.2) Sνt = S0 +
∫ t
0
{
Aku +
∑
k′∈K
λk,k′ pk′ ν
k′
u
}
du+Mkt .
In this limit, a single individual’s impact on the price becomes negligible, thus the resulting
mean-field trading rate νk is unaffected by a single agent’s trading rate νj . Therefore, in the
limit, each agent’s objective Hj no longer depends on the whole collection of trading rates
ν−j , but instead only depends on the collection of mean-field processes {νk}k∈K. By using
the objective functional representation in (2.12), expanding dSνt from (3.2), and noticing
that the martingale components vanish under expectation, we may write the agents objective
functional in the infinite population limit as
(3.3) H
ν
j (ν
j) = Cj0 + E
Pk
[∫ T
0
{
qj,ν
j
t
(
Akt + λ
ᵀ
k νt
)
−
(
νjt
qj,ν
j
t
)ᵀ(
ak Ψk
Ψk φk
)(
νjt
qj,ν
j
t
)}
dt
]
,
where for each k ∈ K we define λk ∈ RK as λk = (λk,k′ pk′)k′∈K and where we define νt ∈ RK
as νt = (ν
k)k∈K. In the expression for H
ν
j in (3.3) we suppress the argument ν
−j as, in this
infinite population limit, their effect is felt through the mean-fields for each subpopulation. We
use the superscript in the notation for H
ν
j to indicate the dependence on the set of mean-fields.
Our new objective is to obtain the Nash-equilibrium in this newly defined mean-field game.
The Nash equilibrium for the MFG consists of finding the infinite collection of controls {νj}∞j=1
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that satisfies the optimality condition
(3.4) νj,∗ = arg max
ω∈Aj
H
ν∗
j (ω) ,
as well as the consistency condition
(3.5) νk,∗ = lim
N↗∞
1
N
∑
j∈K(N)k
νj,∗t ,
for all k ∈ K.
In the limit, the explicit dependence of an agent’s actions in another agent’s objective
functional is replaced with an implicit dependence through the consistency condition.
3.2. The Agent’s Optimality Condition. To solve the optimization problem described
in Section 3.1, we must determine what strateg maximizes the rhs of equation (3.4) for all
agents. This can be achieved in our particular case by using tools from infinite dimensional
convex-analysis or variational calculus. First, we demonstrate that each function H
ν
j is a
strictly concave functional of νj . Next, as H
ν
j is a functional with an infinite-dimensional
argument, we show that each functional H
ν
j is Gaˆteaux differentiable within the space Aj and
compute the Gaˆteaux derivative explicitly. General results in convex optimization then state
that if the derivative vanishes at a point within the space Aj , it must be the point at which
H
ν
j attains its supremum. The lemmas that follow give us the required properties for H
ν
j .
Lemma 3.2. The functional H
ν
j defined in equation (3.3) is strictly concave in Aj up to
P× µ null sets.
Proof. See A.1.
Lemma 3.3. For an agent-j in sub-population k, the functional H
ν
j defined in equation (3.3)
is everywhere Gaˆteaux differentiable in Aj. The Gaˆteaux derivative at a point ν ∈ Aj in a
direction ω ∈ Aj can be expressed as
〈
DHνj (ν), ω
〉
=EP
k
[∫ T
0
ωt
{
− 2akνt − 2Ψkqj,νT
+
∫ T
t
(
EP
k
[
Aku + λ
ᵀ
k νu | F ju
]
− 2φk qj,νu
)
du
}
dt
]
.
(3.6)
Proof. See A.2.
Therefore, since H
ν
j is concave, the supremum of H
ν
j is attained at a point ν ∈ Aj if and
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only if the expression (3.6) vanishes for all ω ∈ Aj . Moreover, the strict concavity of Hνj
guarantees that such a point is unique up to P×µ null sets. Indeed, as the following theorem
shows, the collection of points {νj}∞j=1 that ensures (3.6) vanishes for all j ∈ N, and for all
ω ∈ Aj , coincides with the solution of an infinite-dimensional system of FBSDE.
Theorem 3.4. We have that
(3.7) νj,∗ := arg max
ν∈Aj
H
ν∗
j (ν)
for all j ∈ N if and only if for each agent-j in sub-population k, νj,∗ ∈ H2T and νj,∗ is the
unique strong solution to the FBSDE
(3.8)
−d(2 ak ν
j,∗
t ) =
(
EP
k
[
Akt + λ
ᵀ
k ν
∗
t | F jt
]
− 2φk qj,ν
j,∗
t
)
dt− dMjt ,
2 ak ν
j,∗
T = −2 Ψk qj,ν
j,∗
T ,
where Mj ∈ H2T is an F j-adapted Pk-martingale and where
(3.9) νk,∗t = lim
N→∞
1
N
(N)
k
∑
j∈K(N)k
νj,∗t ,
for all k ∈ K.
Proof. See A.3.
Theorem 3.4 reduces the convex optimization problem (3.3), (3.4), and (3.5) into an infi-
nite system of FBSDEs. The forward component comes from the latent drift processes Ak and
inventory processes qj,ν
j,∗
, while the backwards component comes from the trading rates νj,∗.
The coupling in this system appears through the mean-field processes ν, which averages out all
of the actions of other agents within the game. A few difficulties are immediately apparent in
the FBSDE (3.8). Firstly, each individual FBSDE, corresponding to a particular agent’s trad-
ing rate, is written in terms of a martingale that is specific to the agent’s sub-population, and
the measure under which the process is a martingale corresponds to the agent’s belief about
the drift process Ak. Secondly, the conditional expected value EPk
[
Akt + λ
ᵀ
k ν
∗
t | F jt
]
appears
in the driver of the FBSDE. This is a projection of the mean-fields onto the agent’s filtration,
and appears because the agent cannot directly observe the strategies of other individuals.
This projection of the mean-fields adds another layer of difficulty.
Recall that a solution to the FBSDE (3.8) for agent-j consists of a pair of processes
(νj,∗,Mj) that satisfies the SDE and terminal condition in (3.8) P × µ almost everywhere.
MFG WITH DIFFERING BELIEFS FOR ALGO TRADING 11
For the requirements of Theorem 3.4 to be met, a solution must simultaneously meet the
consistency condition (3.9) P × µ almost everywhere. If we can find a set of solutions, we
can guarantee it is unique up to P × µ null sets due to the strict convexity of the objective
functional and the ‘if and only if’ nature of the statement.
3.3. Solving the Optimality FBSDE. In this section, we solve the FBSDE (3.8), and
hence provide an exact form for the Nash-equilibrium for the infinite population mean-field
game. The key to obtaining a solution lies in first postulating a structure for the solution
of (3.8). This form then suggests a vector valued FBSDE that the mean-field processes νk
must satisfy, which are independent of any individual agent’s strategy. The resulting non-
standard FBSDE system, is defined across the set of K measures {Pk}k∈K and introduces an
obstacle in solving it directly. The key step in obtaining a solution lies in representing the
FBSDE in terms of a single measure, and solving it there.
Due to the linear form of the FBSDE (3.8), it is natural to assume that the solution is
affine. As such, for an agent-j within a sub-population k, we seek for optimal controls of the
form
(3.10) 2 ak ν
j,∗
t = 2 ak ν
k,∗
t + h
k
2,t
(
qj,ν
j,∗
t − q¯k,ν
k,∗
t
)
,
where hk2,t : [0, T ] → R is an unknown deterministic, continuously differentiable, function
of time, and where we define the mean-field inventory process q¯k,ν
k,∗
= (q¯k,ν
k,∗
t )t∈[0,T ] for
sub-population k as
q¯k,ν
k,∗
t = m¯k +
∫ t
0
νk,∗u du .
Plugging this ansatz into (3.8) and simplifying, we find that
0 =
{
∂th
k
2,t + (h
k
2,t)
2 − 2φk
}(
qj,ν
j,∗ − q¯k,νkt
)
dt
+
{
d(2 ak ν
k,∗
t ) +
(
EP
k
[Akt + λ
ᵀ
k ν
∗
t |F jt ]− 2φk q¯k,ν
k,∗
t
)
dt− dMjt
}
,
(3.11)
along with the boundary condition that
(3.12) 0 = {hk2,T + 2 Ψk}(qj,ν
j,∗
T − q¯k,ν
k,∗
T ) + {2akνk,∗T + 2Ψkq¯k,ν
k,∗
T } ,
which must both hold Pk × µ almost everywhere. Therefore, to solve the FBSDE (3.8), it is
sufficient for us to make the terms in the curly brackets of equation (3.11) and in the boundary
condition (3.3) vanish independently of one another. Collecting these equations, we obtain a
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first-order Riccati-type ODE for hk2,t,
(3.13)
 ∂th
k
2,t + (h
k
2,t)
2 − 2φk = 0 ,
hk2,T =− 2Ψk ,
as well as a linear FBSDE for the mean-field process νkt
(3.14)
−d(2 ak ν
k,∗
t ) =
(
EP
k
[Akt + λ
ᵀ
k ν
∗
t | F jt ]− 2φk q¯k,ν
k,∗
t
)
dt− dMjt ,
2 ak ν
k,∗
T =− 2 Ψk q¯k,ν
k,∗
T ,
where Mj =
(
Mjt
)
t∈[0,T ]
∈ H2T is an F j-adapted Pk-martingale.
Let us point out here that the ansatz for νj,∗ found in equation (3.10) satisfies the con-
sistency condition as long as there exist solutions to the equations (3.13) and (3.14). This
can be most easily seen by taking the average of (3.10) over j ∈ KNk and taking the limit as
N →∞.
The FBSDE (3.14) implies that the solution νk,∗ should be an F j-adapted process. How-
ever, Equation (3.14) holds for any agent-j′ for which j′ ∈ Kk, i.e., any agent within the same
sub-population, therefore for each k ∈ K, νk,∗ should be F j-adapted for any j ∈ Kk. Con-
sequently, letting Ft :=
∧
k∈KF jt = σ
(
(Su)u∈[0,t]
)
, each νk,∗ is in fact an F-adapted process
which solves the FBSDE
(3.15)
−d(2 ak ν
k,∗
t ) =
(
EP
k
[Akt + λ
ᵀ
k ν
∗
t | Ft]− 2φk q¯k,ν
k,∗
t
)
dt− dMkt ,
2 ak ν
k,∗
T =− 2 Ψk q¯k,ν
k,∗
T ,
where Mk = (Mkt )t∈[0,T ] is an F-adapted, Pk-martingale, and the expectation appearing in
the drift is conditional on Ft not F jt .
By stacking the FBSDEs (3.15) over all values of k ∈ K, we may obtain a vector-valued
FBSDE for the process ν∗. To this end, define the column vector of filtered drift processes
Â = (Ât)t∈[0,T ] where Ât =
(
EPk [Akt |Ft]
)
k∈K
. Next, as ν∗t is Ft-measurable, stacking the
FBSDEs (3.15) over all values of k ∈ K, we have
(3.16)
−d(2aν
∗
t ) =
(
Ât + Λν
∗
t − 2φ q¯ν
∗
t
)
dt− dMt ,
2aν∗T =− 2 Ψ q¯ν
∗
T ,
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where a,φ,Ψ and Λ are all real-valued K ×K matrices defined as
a = diag ({ak}k∈K) , φ = diag ({φk}k∈K) ,
Ψ = diag ({Ψk}k∈K) , Λ =

λ1,1 p1 . . . λ1,K pK
...
...
λK,1 p1 . . . λK,KpK
 ,
where q¯ν
∗
t = m0+
∫ t
0 ν
∗
u du, andM = (Mk)k∈K is a column vector of the F-adapted processes,
where as a reminder, Mkt ∈ H2T , ∀k ∈ K and the k-th element M
k
is a Pk-martingale.
From the linear structure of the FBSDE (3.16), we can further simplify the problem by
seeking for affine solutions of the form
(3.17) 2aν∗t = g1,t + g2,t q¯
ν∗
t ,
where g2,t : [0, T ]→ RK×K is a deterministic and continuously differentiable function of time,
and g1 = (g1,t)t∈[0,T ] ∈ H2T is an Rk-valued stochastic process. Plugging the ansatz into (3.16),
and following through with the same logical steps as before, we find that the ansatz holds true
so long as g2 is the solution to the Ricatti-type matrix-ODE
(3.18)
 ∂tg2,t =
(
Λ + g2,t
)
(2a)−1 g2,t − 2φ ,
g2,T = −2Ψ ,
and when g1,t solves the BSDE,
(3.19)
 −dg1,t =
(
Ât +
(
Λ + g2,t
)
(2a)−1 g1,t
)
dt− dMt ,
g1,T = 0 ,
where M is the same vector of processes present in FBSDE (3.16).
At this point, we have succeeded in reducing the search for a Nash-equilibrium to solving
(i) two deterministic ordinary differential equations (ODEs) (3.13) and (3.18), and (ii) a non-
standard linear BSDE (3.19). The ODEs are straightforward to solve, however, BSDE poses
some further challenges.
One of the primary obstacles in solving the BSDE (3.19) is that each component of incor-
porates a process that is a martingale under a different probability measure. Recall that the
components of M = {Mk}k∈K are required to be martingales with respect to the k different
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measures {Pk}k∈K. Each measure is what agents within sub-population k use to compute
expectations, and agents within that sub-population assume the asset has drift Ak in excess
of the order-flow from all agents. The key step in solving the BSDE is to re-cast it in terms of
martingales under a single probability measure. This introduces non-trivial drfit adjustments,
however, we find that it is indeed possible to solve the modified BSDE explicitly.
Consider the kth dimension of the BSDE (3.19)
(3.20) − dgk1,t =
(
Âkt +G
k
t g
k
1,t
)
dt− dMkt ,
where Mk is a Pk-martingale, and where Gkt is defined as the k-th row of the deterministic
matrix-valued functionGt =
(
Λ + g2,t
)
(2a)−1. The solution of BSDE (3.20) can be expressed
implicitly as follows
(3.21) gk1,t = EP
k
[ ∫ T
t
{
Âku +G
k
u g1,u
}
du
∣∣∣∣ Ft ] .
Next, we aim to represent (3.21) in terms of expectation under another measure Q such
that Q ∼ Pk for all k. By the assumption that Pk ∼ Pk′ for all k, k′ ∈ K, there always exists
such a measure. For example, Q = Pk for some k. Given this measure, define the F-adapted
Radon-Nikodym derivative processes
(3.22) ZQ,kt =
dPk
dQ
∣∣∣∣
Ft
:= E
[
dPk
dQ
∣∣∣∣ Ft] , ∀k ∈ K .
Using this process, we find that we may write equation (3.21) as an expected value under the
Q measure as,
(3.23) ZQ,kt g
k
1,t = EQ
[∫ T
t
{
ZQ,ku Â
k
u + Z
Q,k
u G
k
u g1,u
}
du
∣∣∣∣ Ft] .
Defining the diagonal RK×K valued processZQ = (ZQt )t∈[0,T ], whereZQt = diag(ZQ,kt )k∈K,
allows us to write a linear BSDE for ZQt g1,t =
(
ZQ,kt g
k
1,t
)
k∈K
using a single measure Q. More
specifically, from (3.23), we have that
(3.24) − d
(
ZQt g1,t
)
=
(
ZQt Ât +ZQt Gt g1,t
)
dt− dM˜t ,
where M˜ = (M˜t)t∈[0,T ] is an RK-valued Q-martingale. The BSDE (3.24) is linear and its
solution can be expressed in closed form. The following theorem provides a representation for
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the solution of g1 as well as {hk2}k∈K, and g2.
Theorem 3.5 (Solutions to the Mean-Field BSDEs).
I) Let Q be any probability measure such that Q ∼ P. Then the BSDE (3.19) admits a
closed form solution,
(3.25) g1,t = EQ
[∫ T
t
(EQt )−1 EQu Âu du
∣∣∣Ft ] ,
where Et is the solution to the forward matrix-valued SDE
(3.26) dEQt = EQt
(
Gt dt+ (ZQt )−1dZQt
)
, EQ0 = ZQ0 ,
where the deterministic matrix valued function Gt :=
(
Λ + g2,t
)
(2a)−1 and
(3.27) ZQt = diag
(
dPk
dQ
∣∣∣∣
Ft
)
k∈K
.
II) There exists a unique solution g2,t to the matrix valued ODE (3.18) that is bounded
over the interval [0, T ].
Moreover, let Y t : [0, T ]→ R2K×K be defined as
(3.28) Y t = e
(T−t)B
(
I(K×K), −2 Ψ
)ᵀ
,
where B ∈ R2K×2K is the block matrix
(3.29) B =
(
0(K×K) −(2a)−1
−2φ Λ(2a)−1
)
,
then, using the matrix partition Y t = (Y 1,t,Y 2,t)
ᵀ, where Y 1,t,Y 2,t ∈ RK×K , the
function g2,t may be expressed as
(3.30) g2,t = Y 2,t Y
−1
1,t .
III) The ODE (3.13) admits the unique solution
(3.31) hk2,t = −2ξk
(
Ψk cosh (−γk(T − t) )− ξk sinh (−γk(T − t) )
ξk cosh (−γk(T − t) )−Ψk sinh (−γk(T − t) )
)
, ∀k ∈ K,
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where the constants γk =
√
φk/ak and ξk =
√
φkak. Moreover, h
k
2,t ≤ 0 for all
t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof. See A.4.
This theorem shows that g1 may be expressed in terms of any measure Q ∼ P, which
includes any of the {Pk}k∈K. The representations for g1, g2 and hk2 in (3.25), (3.30) and
(3.31), respectively, together with the form of νj,∗ in (3.10), provides us with a candidate for
the optimal control in the population limit. It only remains to ensure that this optimal control
is indeed admissible, i.e., νj,∗ ∈ Aj . The following theorem provides sufficient conditions for
this to hold.
Theorem 3.6. Let us assume that g1 ∈ H2T . Then the optimality equation (3.8) admits the
solution
(3.32) νj,∗t = ν
k,∗
t +
1
2ak
hk2,t (q
j,νj,∗
t − q¯k,ν
k,∗
t ) ,
and the mean-field trading rate process ν∗ =
(
νk,∗
)
k∈K may be written
(3.33) ν∗t = g1,t + g2,t q¯
ν∗
t ,
where g1, g2 and h
k
2 are the functions defined in Theorem 3.5, and the mean-field inventory
process q¯ν
∗
= (q¯k,ν
k,∗
)k∈K is
q¯νt = m¯+
∫ t
0
ν∗u du .
Moreover, the collection of proposed optimal solutions satisfies
(3.34) νj,∗ = arg max
ω∈Aj
H
ν∗
j (ω)
for all j ∈ N.
Proof. See A.5.
Theorem 3.6 guarantees, under the technical assumption that g1 ∈ H2T , our proposed
solution forms a Nash-equilibrium for the limiting mean-field game. Moreover, Theorem (3.4)
guarantees that the solution is unique up to P × µ null sets. The condition g1 ∈ H2T holds
for the class of models presented in Sections 4 and 7. While these models are not exhaustive,
they provide an instructive class to study.
3.4. Properties of the Optimal Control. The optimal solution provided in Theorem (3.6)
admits many interesting properties. Firstly, the mean-field trading rate in (3.33) contains two
MFG WITH DIFFERING BELIEFS FOR ALGO TRADING 17
parts: (i) a ‘risk control’ portion g2,t q¯
ν∗
t , which is independent of the dynamics of the asset
price process; and (ii) an ‘alpha trading’ or statistical arbitrage portion g1.
The ‘risk control’ portion survives even when Ak = 0 ∀k ∈ K, i.e., the midprice process
subtracted from total order-flow is a martingale and induces interactions between the various
sub-populations due to the their permanent impact. It can be shown through numerical
examples that this function scales with the parameter matrix φ and Ψ to make agents liquidate
their inventories faster when either φ or Ψ become large, thereby controlling the risk agents
take while trading.
In the ‘alpha trading’ portion, agents adjust their trading based on a weighted average
of Â, the estimated drift of the asset price for all agents. The weighting process E encodes
both information about the ‘risk’ portion of the algorithm, g2, as well as information about all
other agent’s measures through the process Z, which implicitly appears through the dynamics
of E. The weighting function compensates for the differing models agents use for the asset
price, and adjusts the individual trading rates to account for the price impact due to ‘alpha
trading’ of all other agents.
The Nash equilibrium, provided in Theorem 3.6, resembles the one obtained in [7], with
the main differences lying in the expression for the value of the function g1. The differences
are important and reveal themselves in two ways.
First, here, we have a stochastic weighting process E defined by the SDE (3.26) which
replaces the deterministic time-ordered exponential function present [7]. In fact, we can view
E as the natural extension of the time-ordered exponential appearing in [7] to the case of
stochastic processes. Second, to determine the correction to trading, rather than weighting a
single estimate of future alpha as in [7], all posterior estimated alphas’ Âk under all measures
Pk, k ∈ K, play a role. Finally, when Pk = Pk′ for all k, k′ ∈ K, the optimal controls in
Theorem 3.6 match the one presented in [7].
Thus far, we discussed the optimal mean-field strategy. The individual agents’ trad-
ing rates also admit an interesting structure. An arbitrary agent trades at their own sub-
population mean-field rate νk plus a correction term proportional to the difference between
their individual inventory and the mean-field inventory: (qj,ν
j,∗ − q¯k,νk). This difference can
be solved for in terms of the difference between the initial inventory of the agent and it’s
sub-population prior mean:
(3.35) (qj,ν
j,∗
t − q¯k,ν
k,∗
t ) = (Q
j
0 − m¯k) e
∫ t
0 h
k
2,u du,
where hk2,t ≤ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Therefore, the difference in inventories shrinks towards zero
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at a deterministic rate, and agents are consistently drawing their inventories closer to their
sub-population’s mean-field. As time elapses, all agents in a sub-population resemble that of
their sub-population’s mean-field.
4. An Example Model of Disagreement. In this part, we provide an example model
where the asset price process is modulated by a latent Markov chain similarly to that in [6].
In our model, we assume each sub-population disagrees on the distribution of initial value of
the latent process, while they do agree on what the possible values of the latent state are, and
agree on the transition rates between states. One can view this as all agents believing there
are positive, neutral, and negative drift environments, but disagree on what is the current
environment. We prove that the resulting optimal control presented in Theorem 3.6 exists
and is well-defined, i.e., that g1 ∈ H2T , under this general model assumption.
To this end, assume that the asset price satisfies the SDE
(4.1) dSν
(N)
t =
(
J∑
i=1
αit 1{Θt=θi} +
∑
k′∈K
λk,k′ p
(N)
k′ ν
k′,(N)
u
)
dt+ σdWt ,
where Θt is a continuous-time Markov chain taking values in the set {θi}i∈J (J = {1, . . . , J})
and where the processes αi = (αit)t∈[0,T ] are F-predictable processes satisfying αi ∈ H2T for all
i ∈ J. In this model, agents across different sub-populations have different prior probabilities
on the initial value of the latent process, so that under the measure Pk(Θ0 = θi) = pik,i0 ∈ (0, 1)
with
∑
i∈J pi
k,i
0 = 1. We assume that under each measure Pk, the latent Markov chain Θt has
the same infinitesimal generator matrix1 C. Furthermore, we assume that W is a stardard
Brownian motion in each measure Pk and that σ > 0 is constant. We also simplify the impact
model, and assume all agents have the same impact term λ in each measure, so that, in the
notation of section 2, we have λk = λ for all k ∈ K.
This model may be interpreted as a case in which agents all agree on the dynamics of
the asset price Sν and the latent process Θ but disagree on the initial value of the latent
process. The specification allows us to compute the expression for the processes {ZPkt }k∈K,
which are used to compute each agent’s optimal strategy. With this model, we may compute
the Radon-Nikodym derivative process ZPkt for any measure Pk.
Proposition 4.1. Fix Q = Pk for some k ∈ K. If the asset price dynamics follow the latent
Markov chain model of equation (4.1), then ZPkt , defined in Theorem 3.5, may be expressed
1The generator matrix C ∈ RJ×J can be any matrix satisfying the conditions Ci,j ≥ 0 for all i 6= j ∈ J
and Ci,i =
∑
j 6=i∈J Ci,j . C defines the transition dynamics of the latent Markov chain Θt through the relation,
Pk
(
Θt+h = θi
∣∣∣Θt = θj) = (ehC)i,j , where ehC represents the matrix exponential.
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as
(4.2) ZPkt =
∑
j∈J
Mkj Pk
(
Θ0 = θj
∣∣Ft) ,
where for each j ∈ J we define the diagonal matrix Mkj = diag
(
pik
′,j
0
/
pik,j0
)
k′∈K
.
Proof. See A.6.
From expression (4.2), it is clear that ZPk is almost surely bounded, since Pk (Θ0 = θj∣∣Ft) ∈
[0, 1] and pik,i0 ∈ (0, 1) for all k ∈ K, i ∈ J. We use this fact in the proof of the following
proposition.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose that the asset price process is given by Equation (4.1), then the
solution g1 defined in Theorem 3.5 satisfies g1 ∈ H2T and thus the results of Theorem 3.6 apply
to the model described in this section.
Proof. See A.7.
Although we show that there exist models for which the mean-field optimal control pre-
sented in Theorem 3.5 is well defined, computing these controls presents us with another
challenge. In particular, due to the complicated nature of the process EQ, the conditional
expected value appearing in the expression (3.25), for obtaining g1, is difficult to compute. In
section 7, we address this issue by presenting a computational method to approximate such
expressions.
5. The -Nash Equilibrium Property. In Section 3, we solve the stochastic game in the
infinite population limit, and provide an exact representation of each agent’s control at the
Nash-equilibrium. One important question to ask is how the optimal MFG strategy performs
in a finite-population game. We study the properties of the limiting strategy in the finite
game by looking at how close the collection of limiting strategies, defined in Theorem (3.6) is
to the true Nash-equilibrium of a game with only N agents.
Let us consider a finite game with N players, as described in Section 2. Let’s assume that
each of the agents in this population use the strategy described in Theorem 3.6. Each agent
computes the process νt according to equation (3.33), and then uses these values to compute
their own trading rates, νj,∗t , according to equation (3.32). In the theorem that follows, we
show that this collection of controls can be arbitrarily close to the Nash equilibrium in a finite
player game, provided that the population size is large enough.
Theorem 5.1 (-Nash equilibrium). Consider the collection of objective functionals {Hj : j ∈ N}
defined in equation (2.11) and the set of optimal mean-field controls {νj,∗}Nj=1 defined in The-
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orem (3.6). Suppose that there exists a sequence {δN}∞N=1 such that δN → 0 and
(5.1)
∣∣∣∣N(N)kN − pk∣∣∣∣ = o(δN )
for all k ∈ K, then
(5.2) Hj(ν
j,∗, ν−j,∗) ≤ sup
ν∈A
Hj(ν, ν
−j,∗) ≤ Hj(νj,∗, ν−j,∗) + o( 1N ) + o(δN )
for each j ∈ N.
Proof. See A.8.
Theorem 5.1 shows that for any  > 0, there exists N such that for all N > N, the
collection of controls {νj,∗}Nj=1 is less than  away from the true Nash-equilibrium. The
statement of the theorem also reveals that the rate N must be at least linear in 
−1 and is
dependent on the rate at which δN vanishes in the limit.
6. A Simulation-Based Computational Method. For most non-trivial models, obtain-
ing a closed-form expression for the solution to the BSDE (3.25) for g1,t proves to be very
difficult. To overcome this difficulty, we present a simulation-based computational method
to approximate solutions. We propose a Least-Square-Monte-Carlo (LSMC) based method,
which closely resembles the methods used to approximate solutions of BSDEs, as in [1] and
[12]. Unlike these two methods, however, we do not concern ourselves with the computation
of the martingale portion of the BSDE (3.24), since it is not required to compute g1.
To this end, define the M -point uniform partition of the interval [0, T ], T := {tm := m×
∆, m = 0, 1, . . . ,M} where M is a positive integer and where ∆ := T/M is the discretization
interval . We aim to approximate the process g1 over the partition T with a discrete-time
stochastic process gˆ1 =
{
gˆ1,tm
}
tm∈T , where each gˆ1,tm ∈ R
K .
To derive an expression for gˆ1, we first study the expression for g1,t,
(6.1) g1,t = EQ
[∫ T
t
(EQt )−1 EQu Âu du
∣∣∣Ft]
at the points tm ∈ T . This expression may be written recursively over T as follows
(6.2) g1,tm = E
Q
[∫ tm+1
tm
(EQtm)−1 EQu Âu du+ (EQtm)−1 EQtm+1 g1,tm+1
∣∣∣Ftm] .
Next, approximating the time-integral in the previous expression with its left end-point, we
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obtain the approximation
(6.3) g1,tm ≈ EQ
[
Âtm∆ + (EQtm)−1 EQtm+1 g1,tm+1
∣∣∣Ftm] .
A further simplification follows by approximating the term (EQtm)−1 EQtm+1 for small values
of ∆. Using the definition of EQ in Equation (3.26), we may factor EQ as EQt = E˜
Q
t ZQt , where
E˜Qt is the solution the the matrix-valued SDE dE˜Qt = E˜Qt
(
ZQt Gt (ZQt )−1
)
dt with initial
condition E˜Q0 = I(K×K). For ∆  1, we freeze the process in parenthesis at their tm values,
so that dE˜Qt ≈ E˜Qt
(
ZQtmGtm (ZQtm)−1
)
dt over each interval [tm, tm+1), resulting in
(E˜Qtm)−1 E˜
Q
tm+1 ≈ exp
{
ZQtmGtm (ZQtm)−1∆
}
= ZQtm exp {Gtm∆} (ZQtm)−1 ,(6.4)
where exp represents matrix exponential. By plugging in this last result into equation (6.3),
we obtain an approximation gˆ1 for the process g1 at tm as
(6.5) gˆ1,tm = E
Q
[
Âtm∆ + exp {Gtm∆} (ZQtm)−1ZQtm+1 gˆ1,tm+1
∣∣∣ Ftm] .
The final step in obtaining values of gˆ1 is to approximate the conditional expected value
in the rhs of equation (6.5). As is often done, we project the conditional expectation onto
a finite basis of stochastic processes. In particular, let the (vector-valued) stochastic process
Y = (Y t)t∈[0,T ], with Y t ∈ RL where L is some positive integer, and we write
(6.6) EQ
[
Âtm∆ + exp {Gtm∆} (ZQtm)−1ZQtm+1 gˆ1,tm+1
∣∣∣ Ftm] ≈ 〈Y tm ,βtm〉
for some collection {βt}t∈T , where each βt ∈ RL×K , and where the process Y can be chosen
fairly arbitrarily. A common and sensible choice for Y is a finite basis expansion of the state
processes of the problem (i.e. Sνt , ZQt , etc.) and combinations of them.
The algorithm then estimates the coefficients β̂ in a sequential manner. This is done by
first simulating paths of Y t forward over the time partition T using the measure Q, and then
proceeding backwards in time from the boundary condition, solving a least-square regression
problem at each time step tm ∈ T to obtain each of the coefficients β̂. The details of this
algorithm are illustrated in Algorithm 6.1 below. Algorithm 6.1 is an application of the LSMC
methods that already exist for BSDEs and we point the reader to [1] and [12] for more details
on the convergence rates and error bounds.
22 CASGRAIN, P. AND JAIMUNGAL, S.
Algorithm 6.1 The LSMC algorithm used to approximate the
value of the process g1 given in Equation (3.25).
Data: Simulate M0 paths of (Y t,ZQt ,Â) over T using measure Q
Set β̂tM = 0
(L×2)
Set gˆ1,tM (Y ) = 0
(L×2)
for m = M − 1,M − 2, . . . , 1 do
Set
β̂tm = arg minβ
M0∑
n=1
( 〈
Y ntm ,β
〉
−
{
Â
n
tm∆ + exp {Gtm∆} (ZQ,ntm )−1ZQ,ntm+1 gˆ1,tm+1(Y ntm+1)
})2
Set gˆ1,tm(Y ) =
〈
Y ntm , β̂tm
〉
end
As the process ZQ is defined as a diagonal matrix of Radon-Nikodym derivatives, it is
possible to re-write conditional expected value over Q in equation (6.5) in an element-wise
fashion as
(6.7) ĝk1,tm+1 = Â
k
tm∆ +
∑
k′∈K
(exp {Gtm∆})k,k′ EP
k′ [
ĝk
′
1,tm+1
∣∣∣ Ftm] , ∀k ∈ K,
where ( · )k,k′ represents element (k, k′) of the matrix. The above representation allows one to
modify Algorithm 6.1 such that it eliminates the dependence on the process ZQ in the LSMC
procedure, but at the cost of having to simulate the basis process Y across all measures
{Pk}k∈K. We find that in examples where simulating the process ZQt is straightforward, this
is much less efficient than Algorithm 6.1 due to the need of simulating and storing K copies of
the process Y . In cases where ZQ is intractable, however, this modification may be a viable
alternative for computing gˆ1.
Equation (6.7) also provides an additional insight into how the optimal policy is trading.
As pointed out in Section 3.4, the process g1 represents the ‘statistical arbitrage’ portion
of the agent’s optimal trading strategy. Equation (6.7) further reveals that in a small time
interval [tm, tm+1), an agent in sub-population k trades an amount proportionally to their best
estimate of the current drift of the asset price process (Âktm∆) plus a weighted average of the
expected ‘alpha’ trading rates of all sub-populations at the end of the time interval. This can
be interpreted as the agent trading instantaneously based on the amount that the asset price
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is expected to move over the course of the small time interval [tm, tm+1) due to both exogenous
effects coming from the randomness in the price dynamics as well as from endogenous effects
coming from the actions of all other sub-populations on the price. The weights generated
by the matrix exp {Gtm∆} serve to risk adjust agent j’s own alpha trading and to adjust
the effects of other agents based on the scale of their market impacts. Moreover, each of the
expected values present in Equation (6.7) are taken with respect to the measures of other
sub-populations. The reason is that all agents are acting with respect to their own beliefs,
and their trading actions affect the price through the permanent impact factor. Hence, each
agent must account for the action of the other agents using the other agents own measure.
7. Numerical Experiments. This section showcases numerical experiments resulting from
a particular model of differing beliefs. We first assess the performance of the LSMC algorithm
presented in Section 6 by comparing, in the case of equal beliefs, to the analytical results
in [7]. The algorithm is then used to approximate and simulate a finite collection of agents
trading at the mean-field Nash-equilibrium when the agents have differing beliefs.
For the remainder of the section, we assume the asset price process follows a linear mean-
reverting model described in Section 4 with K = 2 sub-populations. Define the un-impacted
asset price process F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ] to be the solution to the SDE
(7.1) dFt = κ (Θt − Ft) dt+ σ dWt ,
where κ, σ > 0, W = (Wt)t∈[0,T ] is a Wiener process in both measures P1 and P2, and
Θ = (Θt)t∈[0,T ] is a latent Markov chain with generator matrix C which can take one of two
values in the set {θ1, θ2}. The asset price process including the price impact is then defined
as having the dynamics
dSν
(N)
t = dFt +
(
λ1 p
(N)
1 ν
1,(N)
t + λ2 p
(N)
2 ν
1,(N)
t
)
dt
with λ1, λ2 > 0 and (p
(N)
k )k∈K defined in Section 2. We assume sub-population 1 believes the
initial value of Θ0 has distribution pi
1
0, while sub-population 2 believes the initial value has
distribution pi20. The dynamics of the asset price process causes it to mean-revert towards
the value of Θt, which may change over the course of the trading period [0, T ]. Furthermore,
this model falls into the class of models described in Section 4, which guarantees that the
mean-field optimal solution from Theorem 3.6 exists and is well defined.
7.1. The LSMC Algorithm. To assess the LSMC algorithm described in Section 6, we
choose a special, non-trivial, case where g1 can be computed in closed form. The case we study
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is when P1 = P2 = P. This reduces the market model to one where all agents agree on the
dynamics of the asset price process. We may then assess the accuracy of the approximation
by comparing the results produced by the LSMC algorithm to the closed-form solution of the
optimal control in [7].
For this particular experiment, we use the model presented in the previous section, but
where the prior on the initial states of the latent process is the same for all agents. The two
sub-populations of agents may, however, differ in their parameter triplet (Ψk, φk, ak). For the
experiments we use the parameters in Table 1. The parameters chosen for this experiment
match the parameters used in the simulations in Section 5 of [7]. Due to the large value
of the parameter Ψk, agents in both sub-populations are incentivized to fully liquidate their
inventory positions before the end of the trading horizon. The risk-aversion parameter φk is
10 times larger in sub-population 2 than in sub-population 1. This can be interpreted as a
model in which agents in sub-population 2 are averse to holding any inventory and are intent
on liquidating their inventories as quickly as possible, while agents in sub-population 1 do not
feel such urgency and are more open to trading on alpha.
k Nk Ψk φk ak
1 20 10 10−2 10−4
2 10 10 10−6 10−4
Table 1: Population and impact parameters for the two sub-populations of agents.
We set T = 1 to be the trading horizon for the model. The asset price process follows
the Markov modulated Ornstein-Uhlenbeck dynamics in (7.1), with parameters provided in
Table 2. Table 2 also defines the parameters for the dynamics of the latent process Θt. Θt is
defined so that the asset price process either mean reverts to θ1 = 4.95 or θ2 = 5.05, depending
on the state of Θ. In this particular experiment, we set the distribution of Θ0 so that there
is an equal chance of starting in each of the states. We also choose an asymmetric generator
matrix so that the latent process is twice as likely to spend time in state 1 than state 2.
pi0 = ( 0.50.5 ), C =
[−1 1
2 −2
]
, θ = {4.95, 5.05},
κ = 5.4, σ = 0.185, and λk = 10
−3
Table 2: The parameters used for the asset price dynamics and for the latent process.
We run Algorithm 6.1 using 104 simulated paths over a partition of size 3600 over the
interal [0, T ] and compare the results from the LSMC algorithm applied to these simulated
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paths to the closed form solution for g1 in [7]. In this particular case, we set the basis process,
Y t, to be a second-order monomial expansion of (S
ν
t ,pit) with product terms included, where
we define piit = P
(
Θt = θi
∣∣Ft) for i = 1, 2. For details on how to compute such conditional
probabilities, see Section B and [6, Section 3].
Figure 1: Error plots for the LSMC algorithm described in Section 6. In these plots, we
compare the value of the LSMC estimate, gˆ1, with the true value of g1, in a special case where
we can compute g1 in closed form. The upper panel shows the standard deviation of the error,
SD
(
gˆk1,t − gk1,t
)
computed over 104 simulations, for each k = 1, 2 over the interval [0, T ]. The
lower panel, plots the quantity E
[|gk1,t − gˆ1,t|] /E [|gk1,t|] computed over 104 simulations, and
provides a measure of relative error.
Figure 1 shows that the LSMC algorithm performs well and with a high level of accuracy
with this particular model. In particular, from the lower panel, we see that the largest relative
error is about 1.5%, meaning that the error is reliably no more than 1.5% of the absolute size
of g1. We have also observed, as elsewhere in the LSMC literature such as in [20] and [23], that
randomizing the initial value of the state process, (S0,pi0), for the forward simulation portion
of the algorithm significantly improves the estimates. Furthermore, the errors reported in this
figure appear to be consistent across a wide variety of model parameters.
For the more general case in which there are different measures assigned to each population,
we set Q = P1 and we enlarge the basis process Y t to be a monomial expansion of the forward
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state process (Sνt , {pikt }k∈K, {ZP
1,k
t }k∈K). Expansions with respect to different bases, such as
Laguerre or Hermite polynomials, are also possible, however, in our experiments, we find the
monomial basis expansion performs well enough.
7.2. A Simulation of the Market. In this section, we simulate the full market with agents
of differing beliefs disagreement. The example continues to use the model in Section 7.1 with
the parameters in Table 1 and 2, with the exception that the distributions on Θ0 now differs
across each of the sub-populations. In particular, we assume agent’s in sub-population 1
believe that prior distribution over initial states is pi10 = (
0.1
0.9 ), while the sub-population 2
believe it is pi20 = (
0.9
0.1 ). In other words, sub-population 1 believes that the latent process will
much more likely begin in the higher state, while sub-population 2 assumes the reverse. In the
simulation, we also assume the starting inventory of agents in sub-population k has distribution
Qj0 ∼ N (µ¯k, σ¯), where we set µ¯1 = 100, µ¯2 = 0 and σ = 50. The rationale is so that the risk-
averse sub-population 1 begins the trading period long 100 shares on average, while agents in
sub-population 2 begin the trading period with zero shares on average. Over the course of the
simulation, we fix the path of the latent process to begin in the upper state and then jump
down to the lower state at t = 0.5. To compute the trading strategy of each participating
agent, we use the LSMC method from the preceding section to approximate the value of g1
and then use this value in Theorem 3.6 to determine the optimal trading rate of the fictitious
mean-field and then each individual agent. At each time step, we compute the basis process
Y t by using a fifth-order polynomial expansion of the state process (S
ν
t , {pikt }k∈K, {ZP
1,k
t }k∈K),
and use the coefficients obtained by the LSMC algorithm to obtain an approximation for g1,t.
Computing the values of pikt and ZP
1,k
t requires the computation of a collection of posterior
probabilities at each time step. To do this, we make use of the filtering and smoothing
equations which are detailed in Appendix B.
Figure 2 shows one sample path of the simulation of all agents. The figure demonstrates
a number of path-wise properties of the trading algorithm and of the beliefs of each of the
sub-populations of agents. Firstly, the left panel shows that the agents inventory paths differ
significantly between the sub-populations. As mentioned in Section 7.1, and resulting from the
population parameters in Table 1, sub-population 1 is far more risk-averse than sub-population
2. This is reflected in the path-wise variance of their inventory.
Agents in sub-population 1 begin long the asset on average. As these agents are risk-
averse, their main concern is to unwind their position quickly. They are, however, conscious
of their own expectations of the future path of the asset price as well as the expectations of
sub-population 2, which they use to adjust the rate at which their inventory is liquidated.
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Figure 2: State processes from a single simulated scenario of the market. Left panel: inventory
path process from all agents (sub-populations separated by color), the sub-population mean-
field inventory process q¯k, and the sub-population empirical mean inventory q¯k,(N). Right
panel: (top) the unimpacted F and impacted S asset price processes, and the latent Markov
chain Θ; (middle) sub-population filters pik,jt = Pk
(
Θt = θj
∣∣Ft) for the latent process state;
(bottom) the Radon-Nikodym process ZP
1,2
t =
dP2
dP1
∣∣
Ft .
This last effect can be seen through the variations of the inventory paths of sub-population 2
in Figure 2.
Agents in sub-population 2 are instead concerned with profiting from statistical arbitrage.
They begin the trading period by incorrectly assigning a 90% probability that the latent
process is in the upper state. Because of this, they expect the asset price to mean-revert
downwards slightly, so they begin by taking a slight short position in the asset over the time
period t ∈ [0, 0.15]. By time t = 0.15, the asset price has approximately reached the lower
mean reverting level. The agent expects that the asset price will now be reverting upwards
in the long run, since it expects the state of the latent process to switch, which would cause
the price to begin reverting upwards. Because of this, the agent begins reverting their short
position into a long position in the asset over the course of the time period t ∈ [0.15, 0.4].
The asset price trajectory indeed reverts upwards, and these agents gradually update their
posterior state distributions. By time t = 0.4, agents from group 2 are now confident that
the latent process is in the upper state. Moreover, using the same train of logic as before, it
expects the price to mean revert downwards in the long run, due to an expected switch in
the latent process. Thus it gradually shifts to a short position and repeats the same process.
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The magnitude of the long and short positions for sub-population 2 decrease as the end of
the trading period approaches. This is due to the fact that the agent is highly insentivized to
completely liquidate their inventory before time t = 1, and therefore reduces their absolute
exposure so that it is easier to completely liquidate their inventory.
From the ceter-right part of Figure 2, we also see that the posterior distribution over latent
states for each group converge to one another as time progresses. This is since, although their
priors are different, the agents are able collect information so that the effect of the priors on
the final posterior computation is negligible by a certain time. Furthermore, as was pointed
out in the discussion following equation (6.7), the strategies of agents from different sub-
populations feed into one another. This causes agents from different sub-population to move
synchronously with respect to one another, as seen in the left of Figure 2, where the upwards
and downward variations in agent’s strategies happen simultaneously.
The actions of agents from both sub-populations demonstrate that the optimal control
incorporates the beliefs of all agents and weighs them against their own. The filter paths in
the middle right panel of Figure 2 show how both agents eventually learn the true value of the
latent state with high confidence. And this occurs by observing the paths of the price process
only, even if their beliefs on its initial state are incorrect. The Radon-Nikodym derivative path
in the bottom middle panel of Figure 2 provides a sense of how far apart are the measures for
sub-populations 1 and 2. This process varies significantly over the course of the trading period
since agents are constantly updating their estimate of the latent price process by observing
order-flow and the price paths. The variation in this process also demonstrates there is a
non-trivial interdependence between the actions of each agent and the beliefs of all other
agents.
8. Conclusion. This paper introduced a stochastic game for a market in which sub-
populations of agents have different risk-preferences and beliefs on the model for the asset
price process. By taking the infinite population limit of the model, we obtained a more
tractable mean-field game (MFG) model for the market. By using tools from convex anal-
ysis we provide an FBSDE characterization of the optimal control of each agent and thus
the Nash-equlibirum of the MFG. This FBSDE is high dimensional, and non-standard as the
martingale components for each dimension are martingales across different probability mea-
sures. Through some change-of-measure techniques we manage to obtain a solution to this
FBSDE system and for the collection of mean-field optimal controls. We also demonstrated
that the MFG optimal control satisfies the -Nash property, which implies that the limiting
Nash-Equilibrium can be arbitrarily close to the Nash-equilibrium in the finite player game
as long as the population size is large enough. Lastly, we provide a LSMC approximation
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to the MFG optimal control, and use it to study example simulations of markets near their
Nash-equilibrium.
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Appendix A. Proofs.
A.1. Proof of Lemma 3.2.
Proof. To show that the claim holds, we need to show that for any ρ ∈ (0, 1),
(A.1) H
ν
j (ρν + (1− ρ)ω)− ρHνj (ν)− (1− ρ)Hνj (ω) > 0
for all ν, ω ∈ Aj where νt = ωt at most on P× µ null sets. By noting that
(A.2) q
j,ρν+(1−ρ)ω
t = ρ q
j,ν
t + (1− ρ) qj,ωt ,
we may compute the difference (A.1) using the representation (2.12) of H
ν
j to obtain,
LHS of (A.1) = EP
k
[∫ T
0
ρ
(
νt
q
j,ν
t
)ᵀ
Γk
(
νt
q
j,ν
t
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
ωt
q
j,ω
t
)ᵀ
Γk
(
ωt
q
j,ω
t
)
−
(
ρ
(
νt
q
j,ν
t
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
ωt
q
j,ω
t
))ᵀ
Γk
(
ρ
(
νt
q
j,ν
t
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
ωt
q
j,ω
t
))
dt
]
(completing the square) = EP
k
[∫ T
0
ρ (1− ρ)
((
νt
q
j,ν
t
)
−
(
ωt
q
j,ω
t
))ᵀ
Γk
((
νt
q
j,ν
t
)
−
(
ωt
q
j,ω
t
))
dt
]
,
where we define the matrix Γk =
(
ak Ψk
Ψk φk
)
.
By defining the terms ∆t = νt − ωt, q∆t = qj,νt − qj,ωt , we can expand the above expression to obtain
(A.3) LHS of (A.1) = ρ (1− ρ)EPk
[∫ T
0
{
ak∆
2
t + φk
(
q∆t
)2
+ 2Ψk∆tq
∆
t
}
dt
]
.
As ρ ∈ (0, 1), we only need to demonstrate that the expected value is greater than zero. As φk ≥ 0, the middle
term in (A.3) is ≥ 0. Next, let us focus on the right-most term in (A.3). Because q∆0 = 0, we may write
q∆t =
∫ t
0
∆u du. Using integration by integrating by parts then yields
(A.4) EP
k
∫ T
0
2 ∆t q
∆
t dt = EP
k
[(
q∆T
)2]
≥ 0 .
As Ψk ≥ 0, this inequality implies the right-most term in (A.3) is non-negative. Lastly, notice that if (P×µ)(νt 6=
ωt) > 0, then (Pk × µ)(νt 6= ωt) > 0 by absolute continuity of the measures, and therefore
(A.5) EP
k
[∫ T
0
∆2t dt
]
> 0 .
As ak > 0, this result together with the inequality from the other two terms, shows that (A.1) is strictly greater
than zero.
A.2. Proof of Lemma 3.3.
Proof. Using the definition of the Gaˆteaux derivative,
(A.6)
〈
DHνj (ν), ω
〉
= lim
↘0
H
ν
j (ν +  ω)−Hνj (ν)

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we aim to show this limit exists and is equal to the result provided in the lemma. Using the representation for
the objective H
ν
j in (2.12), canceling out the t = 0 terms, and using the linearity of the process q
j,ν
t − qj,ν0 in
the variable ν, we have
H
ν
j (ν +  ω)−Hνj (ν) = EP
k
[∫ T
0
{
(qj,ωt − qj,ω0 )(Akt + λᵀk νt)− 2
(
νt
q
j,ν
t
)ᵀ
Γk
(
ωt
q
j,ω
t −q
j,ω
0
)
dt
}]
− 2 EPk
[∫ T
0
(
ωt
q
j,ω
t −q
j,ω
0
)ᵀ
Γk
(
ωt
q
j,ω
t −q
j,ω
0
)
dt
]
,
(A.7)
where Γk =
(
ak Ψk
Ψk φk
)
. Dividing by  and taking the limit yields
(A.8)
〈
DHνj (ν), ω
〉
= EP
k
[∫ T
0
{
(qj,ωt − qj,ω0 )(Akt + λᵀk νt)− 2
(
νt
q
j,ν
t
)ᵀ
Γk
(
ωt
q
j,ω
t −q
j,ω
0
)}
dt
]
.
Expanding the right part of the integrand in (A.8) and re-grouping terms,
〈
DHνj (ν), ω
〉
=EP
k
[ ∫ T
0
(qj,ωt − qj,ω0 )
(
Akt + λ
ᵀ
k νt − 2(φkqj,νt + Ψkνt)
)
dt
−2
∫ T
0
ωt
(
akνt + Ψkq
j,ν
t
)
dt
]
.
(A.9)
As ν, ω ∈ Aj and ν, Â ∈ H2T , the sufficient conditions for Fubini’s theorem are met. Applying Fubini’s
theorem, the tower property and the fact that ωt is Fjt -measurable,
〈
DHνj (ν), ω
〉
=
∫ T
0
EP
k
[
ωt
(
−2akνt − 2Ψkqj,νT +
∫ T
t
{
Aku + λ
ᵀ
k νu − 2φkqj,νu
}
du
)]
dt
=
∫ T
0
EP
k
[
ωt
(
−2akνt − 2Ψkqj,νT + EP
k
[∫ T
t
{
Aku + λ
ᵀ
k νu − 2φkqj,νu
}
du
∣∣∣∣∣Fjt
])]
dt
=
∫ T
0
EP
k
[
ωt
(
−2akνt − 2Ψkqj,νT +
∫ T
t
EP
k
[
Aku + λ
ᵀ
k νu − 2φkqj,νu |Fjt
]
du
)]
dt
=
∫ T
0
EP
k
[
ωt
(
−2akνt − 2Ψkqj,νT +
∫ T
t
EP
k
[
EP
k
[
Aku + λ
ᵀ
k νu|Fju
]
− 2φkqj,νu |Fjt
]
du
)]
dt
=
∫ T
0
EP
k
[
ωt
(
−2akνt − 2Ψkqj,νT +
∫ T
t
EP
k
[
Aku + λ
ᵀ
k νu − 2φkqj,νu |Fjt
]
du
)]
dt
=
∫ T
0
EP
k
[
ωt
(
−2akνt − 2Ψkqj,νT +
∫ T
t
{
EP
k
[
Aku + λ
ᵀ
k νu|Fju
]
− 2φkqj,νu du
})]
dt
which gives the desired result.
A.3. Proof of Theorem 3.4.
Proof. By using lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 we may apply the results of [8, Section 5] which state that, for each
j ∈ J
(A.10) 〈DHνj (νj,∗), ω〉 = 0, ∀ω ∈ Aj ⇔ νj,∗ = arg max
ν∈Aj
H
ν
j (ν) .
Further, the strict concavity of H implies that νj,∗ is unique up to P × µ null sets. Therefore we need only
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demonstrate that 〈DHνj (νj,∗), ω〉 = 0, ∀ω ∈ Aj , if and only νj,∗ is the solution to the FBSDE (3.9).
Sufficiency: Suppose that νj,∗ is the solution to the FBSDE (3.9) and that νj,∗ ∈ H2T . We now show that
νj,∗ ∈ Aj and that 〈DHνj (νj,∗), ω〉 = 0, ∀ω ∈ Aj .
First, the solution to the FBSDE may be represented implicitly as
(A.11) 2 ak ν
j,∗
t = E
Pk
[
−2 Ψk qj,ν
j,∗
T +
∫ T
t
{
EP
k
[
Aku + λ
ᵀ
k νu | Fju
]
− 2φk qj,ν
j,∗
u
}
du
∣∣∣∣ Fjt ] ,
which demonstrates that νj,∗ is Fj-adapted. Therefore, since νj,∗ ∈ H2T and νj,∗ is Fj-adapted, we have that
νj,∗ ∈ Aj . Second, by inserting (A.11) into the expression for the Gaˆteaux derivative (3.6) from Lemma 3.3
and using the tower property, we find that it vanishes almost surely.
Necessity: Suppose that 〈DHνj (νj,∗), ω〉 = 0, ∀ ω ∈ Aj , then
(A.12) EP
k
[
−2akνj,∗t − 2Ψkqj,ν
j,∗
T +
∫ T
t
{
EP
k
[
Aku + λ
ᵀ
k νu | Fju
]
− 2φkqj,ν
j,∗
u
}
du
∣∣∣∣ Fjt ] = 0, P× µ a.e.
To see this, suppose that 〈DHνj (νj,∗), ω〉 = 0 for all ω ∈ Aj , but (A.12) does not hold. Then, choose ω˜ =
(ω˜t)t∈[0,T ] s.t.,
(A.13) ω˜t = EP
k
[
−2akνj,∗t − 2Ψkqj,ν
j,∗
T +
∫ T
t
{
EP
k
[
Aku + λ
ᵀ
k νu | Fju
]
− 2φkqj,ν
j,∗
u
}
du
∣∣∣∣ Fjt ] .
Such ω˜ is Fj-adapted by its very definition. Second, as νk, νj,∗, Ak ∈ H2T , Jensen’s and the triangle inequality
applied to (A.13) implies the bound
EP
k
[∫ T
0
(ω˜t)
2 dt
]
≤ Ck
(
EP
k
[∫ T
0
(νj,∗t )
2 dt
]
+ EP
k
[∫ T
0
(
(Akt )
2 + λ2(νt)
2
)
dt
])
<∞ ,
where the constant Ck = 4
(
1 + a2k + T Ψ
2
k + T
2φ2k
)
. Hence, ω˜ ∈ H2T and therefore ω˜ ∈ Aj . Inserting this
choice of ω˜ into the expression for the Gaˆteaux derivative (3.6), we see that 〈DHνj (νj,∗), ω˜〉 > 0, and hence
contradicts the assumption that 〈DHνj (νj,∗), ω〉 = 0, ∀ω ∈ Aj .
Thus, using (A.12) and noting that νj,∗t is Fj-adapted, using the tower property, we may write
(A.14) 2 ak ν
j,∗
t = E
Pk
[
−2 Ψk qj,ν
j,∗
T +
∫ T
t
{
EP
k
[
Aku + λ
ᵀ
k νu
∣∣∣ Fju]− 2φk qj,νj,∗u } du ∣∣∣∣ Fjt ] ,
and
(A.15) 2 akMjt = EP
k
[
−2 Ψk qj,ν
j,∗
T +
∫ T
0
{
EP
k
[
Aku + λ
ᵀ
k νu
∣∣∣Fju]− 2φk qj,νj,∗u } du ∣∣∣∣ Fjt ] ,
which solves the FBSDE in the statement of the proposition.
A.4. Proof of Theorem 3.5. We separate this proof in 3 parts, corresponding to each of the claims
of the proposition.
Part (I):
To obtain the solution to g1, we first compute the SDE for EQg1, using the SDE for g1 in Equation (3.19)
and the SDE of EQ in Equation (3.26). After expanding the SDE for EQg1, and grouping terms, we find
(A.16) − d
(
EQt g1,t
)
= EQt Ât dt− EQt
{
dMt − (ZQt )−1d
[
ZQ,M
]
t
+ (ZQt )−1dZQt EQt g1,t}
}
.
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As ZQ is a Radon-Nikodym derivative process, it must be a Q-martingale, and by extension, the term
EQt (ZQt )−1dZQt EQt g1,t Q-local-martingale. Next, by the Girsanov-Meyer theorem [22][Chapter III, Thm. 35],
the remainder of the terms in the curly brackets of Equation (A.16) sum to the increment of a Q-local-
martingale. Because of this, we may re-write the BSDE for EQt g1,t as
(A.17) − d
(
EQt g1,t
)
= EQt Ât dt− dM˜t ,
for some martingale term M˜. Using this last result, we may write out the implicit form of the solution as
(A.18) EQt g1,t = EQ
[∫ T
t
EQu Âu du
∣∣∣∣ Fjt ] .
Lastly, multiplying the result on both sides by (EQt )−1, we obtain the stated solution.
Part (II):
The ODE (3.18) is a matrix-valued non-symmetric Riccati-type ODE. We prove the claims concerning the
ODE (3.18) by applying theorems and tools for non-symmetric Riccati ODEs in [11] and [10]. Firstly, define
g˜2,t = g2,T−t. We show that all of the claims hold for g˜2,t, and hence also for g2,t.
From ODE (3.18)
(A.19)
{
∂tg˜2,t =
(
Λ + g˜2,t
)
(2a)−1 g˜2,t − 2φ
g˜2,0 = −2Ψ
.
Next we aim to use Theorem 2.3 of [11] on g˜2,t to prove existence and boundedness of a solution. Using the
notation in [11], define
(A.20) B11 = 0, B12 = −J, B21 = −2φ , B22 = ΛJ ,
and W0 = −2Ψ, where J = (2a)−1. To meet the requirements of Theorem 2.3 in [11], we must find C,D ∈
RK×K , C = Cᵀ so that L+ Lᵀ ≤ 0 and C +DW0 +W ᵀ0Dᵀ > 0, where
(A.21) L =
(
−2Dφ −CJ +DΛJ
0 −JᵀD
)
.
Let D = I(K×K) and C = 5Ψ. With these choices of C,D, and using the fact that Ψ is a diagonal matrix
with positive entries, we find that
(A.22) C +DW0 +W
ᵀ
0D
ᵀ = Ψ > 0 ,
which meets one of the necessary conditions. The choices of C and D also imply that the matrix L takes the
form
(A.23) L =
(
−2φ −(5Ψ + Λ)J
0 −J
)
.
Next, as det(L) = det(−2φ) × det(−J), the set of eigenvalues of L is the union of the set of eigenvalues of
−2φ and those of −J . Because −2φ ≤ 0 and −J < 0, all eigenvalues of L are guaranteed to be non-positive,
and at least one of them is guaranteed to be non-zero, implying that L < 0. Hence, L + Lᵀ < 0 which meets
the second condition of Theorem 2.3 of [11], and guarantees the existence of a solution to the ODE (A.19) and
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hence of (3.18).
As the solution to g2,t exists and is continuous on the interval [0, T ], it follows that it is also bounded on
this interval. Furthermore, the existence and boundedness of the solution and [10, Thm 3.1] guarantees that
the solution is also unique. Using the representation g˜2,t = PtQ
−1
t from [10] and solving the appropriate linear
ODE system for each, we obtain the solution presented in the statement of the proposition.
Part (III):
The reader may verify that the presented solution for the Ricatti ODE (3.13) is valid. Moreover, it is
also easy to verify that the solution is bounded and continuous in the interval [0, T ]. All that remains is to
show that hk2,t ≤ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. If we notice that since t < T and γk ≥ 0 that sinh(−γk(T − t)) ≤ 0 and
cosh(−γk(T − t)) ≥ 1. As ξk,Ψk ≥ 0 we then get that
(A.24)
Ψk cosh (−γk(T − t) )− ξk sinh (−γk(T − t) )
ξk cosh (−γk(T − t) )−Ψk sinh (−γk(T − t) ) ≥ 0 ,
and the desired result follows.
A.5. Proof of Theorem 3.6. To demonstrate the claim of the theorem, we need to show that the
optimality conditions of Theorem (3.4) are fulfilled. As demonstrated in Section 3.3, if there exists solutions
to the Ricatti-type ODEs (3.13) for {hk2,t}k∈K, a matrix-valued Ricatti-type ODE 3.18 for g2,t as well as the
vector-valued BSDE (3.19) for g1,t, then the solution to the optimality FBSDE (3.8) follows the exact form
presented in the statement of this theorem. In Theorem 3.5, we showed that there exist solutions to these
FBSDEs, and hence the solution to the optimality FBSDE of Theorem (3.4) is solved.
All that remains to be shown is that the solution to the optimality FBSDE also belongs to am individual
agent’s set of admissible strategies, Aj and that the consistency conditions are met.
First, we show that νj,∗ ∈ Aj . To do this, we must demonstrate that νj,∗ is Fj-predictable and contained
in H2T . By the definition of ZQ in equation (3.27), it must be an F-adapted process, and by extension EQt
must also be F-predictable. Therefore, by the definition of the conditional expected value, the solution to
g1,t presented in Theorem 3.5 must be F-predictable, and hence the mean-field processes {νk}k∈K must all be
F-predictable as well. Lastly, since νj,∗t = νkt +
hk2,t
2ak
(qj,ν
j,∗
t − q¯k,ν
k
t ) and since q¯
k,νk
t is F-predictable, and since
hk2,t is deterministic, we have that ν
j,∗
t must be Fj-adapted.
Next, we must show that νj,∗ ∈ H2T . Noting that dq¯ν
∗
t = ν
∗
t dt = (g1,t + g2,tq¯
ν∗
t ) dt and that q¯
ν∗
0 =
(m¯k)k∈K = m¯, we can solve for q¯t directly as
(A.25) q¯ν
∗
t = E
(∫ t
0
g2,s ds
)
m¯+
∫ t
0
E
(∫ s
0
g2,s ds
)
g1,s ds ,
where E
(∫ t
0
g2,s ds
)
is the solution to the time-ordered matrix exponential of g2,s. Thus by Yonge’s inequality
and the boundedness of g2,t,
EP
k
∫ T
0
‖q¯ν∗u ‖2 du ≤ 2
(
‖m¯‖2
∫ T
0
∥∥E (∫ t
0
g2,s ds
)∥∥2
2
ds+ T
∫ T
0
∥∥E (∫ s
0
g2,s ds
)∥∥
2
∥∥g1,s∥∥ ds)(A.26)
≤ C0 + C1
∫ T
0
∥∥g1,s∥∥ ds <∞ ,(A.27)
for some C0, C1 > 0, where ‖·‖2 represents the `2 operator norm, . Hence, q¯ν∗ ∈ H2T .
Next, using this last fact, if we compute the expected integrated squared norm of ν over [0, T ], we find
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that
EP
k
∫ T
0
‖ν∗u‖2 du = EP
k
∫ T
0
∥∥∥g1,t + g2,t q¯νu∥∥∥2 du(A.28)
≤ 2
(
EP
k
∫ T
0
∥∥g1,t∥∥2 du+ EPk ∫ T
0
‖g2,t‖22 ‖q¯νu‖2 du
)
(A.29)
≤ C2 + C3 EP
k
∫ T
0
‖q¯νu‖2 du <∞ ,(A.30)
for some constants C2, C3 > 0 and where in the third line of the inequality we use the fact that the function
g2,t is bounded over the interval [0, T ] and the fact that g1 ∈ H2T (as stated in the conditions of the theorem).
Hence, ν ∈ H2T .
Next, notice that
(A.31) EP
k
∫ T
0
|νj,∗u |2 du ≤ 2
(
EP
k
∫ T
0
|νk,∗u |2 du+ EP
k
∫ T
0
|νj,∗u − νk,∗u |2 du
)
.
As νk,∗ ∈ H2T , the above demonstrates that it is sufficient to show that νj,∗u − νk,∗u ∈ H2T to guarantee that
νj,∗ ∈ H2T .
Similarly to q¯t, if we notice that d(q
j,νj,∗
t − q¯k,ν
k,∗
t ) = (ν
j,∗
t − νk,∗t ) dt =
hk2,t
2ak
(qj,ν
j,∗
t − q¯k,ν
k,∗
t ) dt and that
(qj,ν
j,∗
0 − q¯k,ν
k,∗
0 ) = Q
j
0 − m¯k, we can solve exactly for this difference as
(A.32) qj,ν
j,∗
t − q¯k,ν
k,∗
t =
(
Qj0 − m¯k
)
e
∫ t
0
hk2,t
2ak .
As EP
k
(Qj0)
2 <∞ and hk2,t ≤ 0 it is easy to see that
(
qj,ν
j,∗
t − q¯k,ν
k,∗
t
)
∈ H2T .
Using the solution to νj,∗ and using the result above,
(A.33) EP
k
∫ T
t
|νj,∗u − νk,∗u |2 du ≤
supt∈[0,T ](hk2,t)2
4ak
EP
k
∫ T
t
∣∣∣qj,νj,∗t − q¯k,νk,∗t ∣∣∣2 du <∞ ,
where we use hk2,t < 0 in line 3. Hence, ν
j,∗
u − νk,∗u ∈ H2T and νj,∗ ∈ H2T . Thus we have demonstrated that νj,∗
is Fj-predictable, and that νj,∗ ∈ H2T . Therefore νj,∗ ∈ H2T .
Lastly, we demonstrate that the consistency conditions are met. In other words, we must show that
(A.34) νk,∗t = lim
N→∞
1
N
(N)
k
∑
j∈K(N)
k
νj,∗t
for all t ∈ [0, T ] and for all k ∈ K. Using the solution to qj,νj,∗t − q¯k,ν
k,∗
t , we find that
(A.35) lim
N→∞
1
N
(N)
k
∑
j∈K(N)
k
(
νj,∗t − νk,∗t
)
= e
∫ t
0
hk2,t
2ak lim
N→∞
1
N
(N)
k
∑
j∈K(N)
k
(
Qj0 − m¯k
)
.
Now since the Qj0 have bounded variance, the limit on the right vanishes as N → ∞ by the law of large
numbers. Hence, the consistency conditions are met.
The last statement follows from Theorem 3.4.
A.6. Proof of Proposition 4.1.
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Proof. Let us first note that we may represent each element in ZPkt as a Doob-martingale since
(A.36)
dPk
′
dPk
∣∣∣
Ft
= EP
k
[
dPk
′
dPk
∣∣∣
GT
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
.
which implies that
(A.37) ZPkt = diag
(
EP
k
[
dPk
′
dPk
∣∣∣
GT
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
])
k′∈K
.
Each term dP
k′
dPk
∣∣∣
GT
is in fact quite easy to compute. Let us remember that only difference between measures dPk
and dPk
′
is the law of the initial value of the latent process, Θ0. For each k ∈ K, we have that Pk(Θ0 = θj) = pik,j0 .
Thus, we may write the expression for each Radon-Nikodym derivative conditional on GT as
(A.38)
dPk
′
dPk
∣∣∣
GT
=
∑
i∈J
pik
′,i
0
pik,i0
1{Θ0=θi} .
As each
pi
k′,i
0
pi
k,i
0
is constant, taking the conditional expected value with respect to Pk yields
(A.39)
dPk
′
dPk
∣∣∣
Ft
=
∑
i∈J
pik
′,i
0
pik,i0
Pk
(
Θ0 = θi
∣∣∣Ft) .
As the Pk terms in the above expression, we find that ZPkt follows the form in the statement of the proposition.
A.7. Proof of Proposition 4.2.
Proof. We will need to show here that the expression for g1,t presented in Theorem 3.5 satisfies g ∈ H2T .
In other words, we need to show that EP
k
[∫ T
0
‖g1,t‖2 dt
]
<∞ for all k ∈ K.
The first step will be to show that the operator norm of EPkt is almost surely bounded above when using
the latent Markov chain model. For the remainder of this proof, we suppress the superscript Pk for ease of
notation. Simply applying Itoˆ’s lemma, we find that Et = E˜tZPkt , where E˜t is the solution to the SDE
(A.40) dE˜t = E˜tZPkt Gt (ZP
k
t )
−1 dt
with the initial condition E˜0 = IK×K . Writing out the implicit solution of the differential equation and taking
the operator norm we find that
∥∥ E˜t∥∥2 = ∥∥IK×K + ∫ t
0
E˜uZPku Gu(ZP
k
u )
−1 du
∥∥
2
(A.41)
≤ 1 +
∫ t
0
∥∥ E˜uZPku Gu(ZPku )−1∥∥2 du(A.42)
≤ 1 +
∫ t
0
∥∥ E˜u∥∥2∥∥ZPku ∥∥2∥∥Gu∥∥2∥∥(ZPku )−1∥∥2 du ,(A.43)
where we use the triangle inequality, Jensen’s inequality and the property of the operator norm. As shown in
Proposition 4.1, we know that ZPkt is almost surely bounded over the interval [0, T ]. From Theorem 3.5, we
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also know that Gt is bounded over this same interval. Now, looking back to the definition of Zt, we find that
(A.44) Z−1t = diag
(
dPk
′
dPk
∣∣∣
Ft
)
,
which can also be expressed in the same way as presented in Proposition 4.1, which in turn implied that Zt is
almost surely bounded over [0, T ]. Therefore, it follows that there exists a constant C0 > 0 such that
(A.45)
∥∥ E˜t∥∥2 ≤ 1 + C0 ∫ t
0
∥∥ E˜u∥∥2 du .
Applying Gro¨nwall’s lemma to the above yields that supt∈[0,T ]
∥∥ E˜t∥∥2 ≤ eC0T <∞. Repeating the same analysis
on
∥∥E˜−1t ∥∥2 yields the very same bound. Finally, since the operator norms of ZPkt , (ZPkt )−1, E˜t and E˜−1t are all
bounded over [0, T ], we get that there exists a constant C1 > 0 such that supt,u∈[0,T ]
∥∥(Et)−1Eu∥∥2 < eTC1
Next, we wish to show that Â ∈ H2T . Under our model, we may compute Âk as
Âkt = EP
k
[
J∑
i=1
αit 1{Θt=θi}
∣∣Ft](A.46)
=
∑
i∈J
αit Pk(Θt = θi
∣∣Ft) .(A.47)
Therefore, since all of the Pk terms in the above are bounded above by 1, we may use Young’s inequality to
write ∥∥∥Â∥∥∥2 ≤ K2∑
i∈J
∥∥∥αit∥∥∥2 .(A.48)
As each αit ∈ H2T , we get that Â ∈ H2T .
Now we can proceed to showing the main result. Using the bounds we derived above and Jensen’s inequality,
we may write
EP
k
[∫ T
0
‖g1,t‖2 dt
]
≤ EPk
[∫ T
0
∥∥∥∥EPk [∫ T
t
(Et)−1Eu Âu du
∣∣∣Ft]∥∥∥∥2 dt
]
(A.49)
≤ E
[∫ T
0
∫ T
t
∥∥∥(Et)−1Eu Âu∥∥∥2 du dt](A.50)
≤ E
[∫ T
0
∫ T
t
∥∥(Et)−1Eu∥∥22 ∥∥∥Âu∥∥∥2 du dt](A.51)
≤ (T + 1)2 e2C1T EPk
[∫ T
0
∥∥∥Âu∥∥∥2 du] <∞ ,(A.52)
where in the last line, we use the fact that Â ∈ H2T . Thus, we find that g1 ∈ H2T , which verifies the claim of
the proposition.
A.8. Proof of Theorem 5.1. We begin the proof of Theorem 5.1 by introducing a lemma regarding
the distance between the mean-field game objective Hj and the finite player game objective Hj .
Lemma A.1. Let ν ∈ Aj be some arbitrary admissible control and ν−j,∗ ∈ A−j be the collection ν−j,∗ :=(
ν1,∗, . . . , νj−1,∗, νj+1,∗, . . . , νN,∗
)
of optimal controls defined by equation (3.32) in Theorem 3.6 for all agents
except for j. Let us also assume that ν∗ =
(
νk,∗
)
k∈K follows the dynamics of equation (3.33) in Theorem 3.6.
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Then
(A.53)
∣∣∣Hj(ν, ν−j,∗)−Hν∗j (ν)∣∣∣ = o(δN ) + o( 1
N
) .
Proof. Using the definitions of H
ν∗
j and Hj and simplifying down the equations, we find that
∣∣∣Hj(ν, ν−j,∗)−Hj(ν)∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∣EPk
[∑
k′∈K
∫ T
0
λk,k′
(
p
(N)
k′ ν
k′,(N)
t − pk′νk
′
t
)
dt
]∣∣∣∣∣(A.54)
≤
∑
k′∈K
λk,k′
∣∣∣∣EPk [∫ T
0
p
(N)
k′ ν
k′,(N)
t − pk′νk
′,∗
t dt
]∣∣∣∣(A.55)
Therefore it is sufficient for us to show that each of the expected values in the sum of (A.55) is o(N−1)+o(δN ).
Next, notice that using the definitions of ν
k′,(N)
t and p
(N)
k′ , we can decompose the difference of the mean
field rates between the agent’s rate and the rate of all others
p
(N)
k′ ν
k′,(N)
t − pk′νk
′,∗
t =
1
N
(νt − νj,∗t ) +
1
N
(N)
k
∑
i∈K(N)
k′
(p
(N)
k′ ν
j,∗
t − pk′νk
′,∗
t ) ,(A.56)
where νj,∗t is the optimal control that agent-j would have taken in the limiting game.
Using the triangle inequality and Jensen’s along with the last result, we get that
(A.57) (A.55) ≤
∑
k′∈K
λk,k′
 1N EPk
[∫ T
0
|νt − νj,∗t | dt
]
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣E
Pk
 1
N
(N)
k
∑
i∈K(N)
k′
∫ T
0
(p
(N)
k′ ν
j,∗
t − pk′νk
′,∗
t ) dt

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
 .
Now it’s clear that νt−νj,∗t ∈ Aj so we can guarantee that EP
k
[∫ T
0
|νt − νj,∗t | dt
]
is bounded and independent
of N . Therefore,
(A.58)
1
N
EP
k
[∫ T
0
|νt − νj,∗t | dt
]
= o(
1
N
) .
Therefore all that’s left to show is that the right part of the summand of (A.57) vanishes at an appropriate
speed.
By plugging in the manipulation
(A.59) p
(N)
k′ ν
j,∗
t − pk′νk
′,∗
t = (p
(N)
k′ − pk′)νj,∗t + pk′(νj,∗t − νk
′,∗
t )
and using the triangle inequality and Jensen’s inequality, we find that∣∣∣∣∣∣∣EP
k
 1
N
(N)
k
∑
i∈K(N)
k′
∫ T
0
(p
(N)
k′ ν
j,∗
t − pk′νk
′,∗
t ) dt

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣p(N)k′ − pk′ ∣∣∣EPk [∫ T
0
|νj,∗t | dt
]
(A.60)
+ pk′
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣EP
k
 1
N
(N)
k
∑
i∈K(N)
k′
∫ T
0
(νj,∗t − νk
′,∗
t ) dt

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣(A.61)
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As νj,∗ ∈ Aj , we find that EPk
[∫ T
0
|νj,∗t | dt
]
<∞. Therefore by the assumption of the theorem, we get
(A.62)
∣∣∣p(N)k′ − pk′ ∣∣∣EPk [∫ T
0
|νj,∗t | dt
]
= o(δN ) .
Next, using the structure of the solution for νj,∗t from Theorem 3.6, equation (A.32) and the fact that h
k
2,t is
bounded, we get
(A.61) = pk′
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
N
(N)
k
∑
i∈K(N)
k′
EP
k
[(
Qj0 − m¯k
)∫ T
0
e
∫ t
0
hk2,t
2ak dt
]∣∣∣∣∣∣∣(A.63)
≤ C0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
N
(N)
k
∑
i∈K(N)
k′
(
EP
k
[
Qj0
]
− m¯k
)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 0 .(A.64)
Hence, the right part of equation A.57 is equal to o(δN ) + o(N
−1) and the claims of the lemma hold true
A.8.1. Main Proof of Theorem 5.1.
Proof. We prove the result of the theorem by using the Lemma A.1. First, let us note that by the definition
of the supremum,
(A.65) Hj(ω, ν
−j,∗) ≤ sup
ν∈Aj
Hj(ν, ν
−j,∗)
holds for all ω ∈ Aj , and therefore the left-most inequality in the statement of Theorem 5.1 holds.
Next, we must show that the right-most inequality in the statement of Theorem 5.1 also holds. First let
us note that by Lemma A.1, for any ν ∈ Aj ,
Hj(ν, ν
−j,∗) ≤ Hν
∗
j (ν) + o(δN ) + o(N
−1)(A.66)
≤ Hν
∗
j (ν
j,∗) + o(δN ) + o(N
−1) ,(A.67)
where we use the fact that Hj(ν
j,∗) = supν∈Aj Hj(ν). Applying Lemma A.1 again, we find that
(A.68) Hj(ν, ν
−j,∗) ≤ Hj(νj , ν−j,∗) + 2 o(δN ) + 2 o(N−1) .
As the above inequality holds for all ν ∈ Aj we may take the supremum on the left, and cancel out the constant
terms multiplying the little-o terms to yield the final result,
(A.69) sup
ν∈Aj
Hj(ν, ν
−j,∗) ≤ Hj(νj , ν−j,∗) + o(δN ) + o(N−1) .
Appendix B. Filtering and Smoothing Equations.
In sections 4, 6 and 7 we refer to the Radon-Nikodym process ZQ and for the F-projected drift process
Â which are required for the approximation of the optimal control. This appendix will provide the details on
how these quantities are computed for the mean-revertingmodel used in the numerical experiments present in
Section 7.
Let us recall the model provided in Section 7. We assume that the un-impacted asset price process has
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the dynamics
dFt = κ (Θt − Ft) dt+ σ dWt ,
where Θt is a continuous-time Markov chain with generator matrix C which takes values in the set {θi}Ji=1.
What varies across each measure Pk is the distribution over the initial state, Θ0, where we assume that
Pk (Θ0 = θi) = pik,i0 for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , J} and k ∈ K. Our first step will be to compute the Ft-adapted
process Ât =
(
EP
k
[At|Ft]
)
k∈K
. Using the dynamics of Ft, we get that
EP
k
[At|Ft] = EP
k
[κ (Θt − Ft) |Ft]
= κ
(
EP
k
[Θt|Ft]− Ft
)
= κ
(
J∑
i=1
θi Pk
(
Θt = θi
∣∣Ft)− Ft) .
Therefore, to compute Â we need to compute the posterior probabilities of each state of Θt, Pk
(
Θt = θi
∣∣Ft).
The lemma that follows gives an explicit way of computing these probabilities.
Lemma B.1 (Filtering Equation). Let us assume that the Novikov condition
(B.1) EP
k
[
exp
{∫ T
0
(Au)
2 du
}]
<∞
holds for all k ∈ K. For each i = 1, . . . , J and k ∈ K, let pik,it = Pk
(
Θt = θi
∣∣Ft), and define the process
Λk,i =
(
Λk,it
)
t∈[0,T ]
. Then
pik,jt = Λ
k,i
t
/(
J∑
j=1
Λk,jt
)
,
where each Λk,it has the dynamics
dΛk,it = Λ
k,i
t σ
−2κ (θi − Ft) dFt +
J∑
j=1
Ci,jΛ
k,j
t dt ,
with the initial condition Λk,i0 = pi
k,i
0 .
Proof. For the proof of this lemma, we refer the reader to the proof of a more general version of this
statement found in [6, Theorem 3.1].
The next task is to compute the process ZQ for any choice of Q = Pk k ∈ K. We can do this by applying
Proposition 4.1 to the model dynamics that we have. This Proposition 4.1 allows us to compute ZPk , given
that we can compute the value of the time-0 smoothers for Θ, Pk
(
Θ0 = θi
∣∣Ft). The following lemma provides
an expression for the computation of these smoothers.
Lemma B.2 (Smoothing Equation). Assume that the Novikov condition (B.1) holds. For each k ∈ K and
i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , J}, let us define the process Λ˜k,i,j =
(
Λ˜k,i,jt
)
t∈[0,T ]
. Then the time-0 smoother for Θ0 satisfies
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the equation
Pk
(
Θ0 = θi
∣∣Ft) = ( J∑
j=1
pik,i0 Λ˜
k,i,j
t
)/ J∑
i,`=1
pik,i0 Λ˜
k,i,`
t
 ,
where each Λ˜k,i,j0 satisfies the SDE
dΛ˜k,i,jt = Λ˜
k,i,j
t σ
−2κ (θj − Ft) dFt +
J∑
`=1
Cj,`Λ˜
k,i,`
t dt ,
and the initial condition Λ˜k,i,j0 = 1{i=j}.
Proof. For each k ∈ K, let us define the measure Q˜k which is specified through the Radon-Nikodym
derivative
ζkt =
dPk
dQ˜k
∣∣∣
Ft
= exp
{∫ t
0
Au σ
−2 dFu − 1
2
∫ t
0
(Au)
2 σ−2 du
}
.
The Radon-Nikodym derivative above is defined specifically so that under measure Q˜k, (Ft − F0)σ−1 is a
Brownian motion, independent of Θt and so that the dynamics of Θt are left unchanged.
Using this new measure, we can re-represent the time-0 smoother we are looking for as
Pk
(
Θ0 = θi
∣∣Ft) = EQ˜k [1{Θ0=θi}ζkt ∣∣Ft]
EQ˜k
[
ζkt
∣∣Ft]
=
EQ˜
k [
1{Θ0=θi}ζ
k
t
∣∣Ft]∑J
j=1 EQ˜
k
[
1{Θ0=θj}ζkt
∣∣Ft]
Now, if we take a look at the term in the numerator, we can further expand it as
EQ˜
k
[
1{Θ0=θi}ζ
k
t
∣∣Ft] = J∑
j=1
EQ˜
k
[
1{Θ0=θi}1{Θt=θj}ζ
k
t
∣∣Ft]
= pik,i0
J∑
j=1
EQ˜
k
[
1{Θt=θj}ζ
k
t
∣∣Ft ∨ σ (Θ0 = θi)] ,
where we use Bayes’ rule to get to the last line.
Following the proof of [6, Theorem 3.1], we find that
Λ˜k,i,jt = E
Q˜k
[
1{Θt=θj}ζ
k
t
∣∣Ft ∨ σ (Θ0 = θi)]
satisfies the SDE found in the statement of the theorem, with the initial condition Λ˜k,i,j0 = 1{i=j}. Plugging
this back into the previous expressions, we obtain the final result.
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